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MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY CHANGES
cast a deciding vote in favor of the preservation of a free and indepen-
dent press.
CHAN POYNER PIKE
Constitutional Law-Municipal Boundary Changes and the Fifteenth
Amendment
The struggle of blacks in this country to obtain and preserve the
franchise has been a difficult and continuing one. They have had to
overcome many obstructions along the path to the voting booth. The
fifteenth amendment' to the Constitution has served throughout this
struggle as the legal standard by which alleged infringements of the right
to vote have been judged. In Holt v. City of Richmond,2 black residents
of the city utilized the fifteenth amendment to challenge the city's an-
nexation of a portion of a suburban county immediately prior to a city
council election at which black voters were expected to elect a majority
of the members. The Fourth Circuit held in Holt that the annexation
was constitutional on its face and that possible illicit motivations of
those individuals responsible for the annexation were, under the circum-
stances of the case, too remote from the fact of the annexation to taint
its constitutional validity.3
The problem in Holt had its origins in 1962 when the City of
Richmond initiated judicial proceedings to annex portions of two adja-
cent counties, Henrico and Chesterfield. The city first concentrated on
the Henrico area, but upon receiving an unsatisfactory annexation
award from the state annexation court,4 the city diverted its attention
to Chesterfield County. Before a judicial determination was rendered,5
Richmond and Chesterfield County reached a compromise agreement
specifying the new boundaries of Richmond, the price to be paid for the
annexed area, and the county's agreement not to appeal the annexation
'U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, orprevious
condition of servitude."
2459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1972).
11d. at 1094.
11d. at 1095. The annexation court had decided that Richmond ought to pay Henrico County
55 million dollars for 16.16 square miles of land. Richmond thought this price too high.
'the formal trial had first begun in September of 1968, but a mistrial was declared in January
of 1969 when one of the judges disqualified himself. Id.
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decree.' The annexed area included 47,262 people of whom only three
percent were black. The addition of this predominantly white bloc of
voters reduced the percentage of black citizens in Richmond from 51.5
percent to 42 percent of the total population, an important decrease in
a city that elects its councilmen at large.
Black voters filed a class action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia after the annexation.' They alleged
that their fifteenth amendment rights had been violated by the annexa-
tion, which had diluted their strength and had thereby prevented them
from electing a majority of the city council. The district court found that
although Richmond's desire for boundary expansion was not for the sole
purpose of obstructing the voting power of black citizens, the annexa-
tion compromise, especially the County's agreement not to appeal, "was
conceived and operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimi-
nation by way of diluting the vote of the Negroes, and [that] this [was]
constitutionally impermissible."'
While stating that Richmond's motivation for executing the com-
promise agreement was relevant to its decision, the district court empha-
sized that the boundary expansion violated the fifteenth amendment as
the result of the combination of the unlawful motivation and the actual
effects of the annexation compromise. However, the court permitted
the annexation and ordered new council elections under a court-imposed
districting scheme which restored the preannexation voting power of the
black citizens. This scheme negated the effects of the dilution by restrict-
ing the number of councilmen for whom the newly annexed white people
could vote.'0 This remedy would have been effective because it attacked
the heart of the constitutional violation, an annexation timed to occur
just prior to an important election.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court decision.' Concentrating on the issue of the unconstitu-
6The judges of the annexation court were obviously influenced by the compromise agreement
and. at the close of the proceedings, issued an annexation decree in conformity with the agreement.
The decree became effective on January I. 1970, and the new citizens were able to vote in the
councilmanic elections of that year. id.
7Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1971).
Id. at 236.
'Id. at 237.
"Id. at 240. One district, composed of most of the original area of Richmond, was to elect
seven councilmen, and a second district, composed mainly of the newly annexed area, was to elect
t%%o councilmen.
"Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1972).
[Vol, 51
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tional motivation of the city officials, the court explained that "[w]hen
the legislative purpose is not both obvious and constitutionally imper-
missible. . . the cases uniformly hold that facially constitutional legis-
lation may not be stricken because of suspect legislative motivation.'
12
The court then overruled the district court on its findings of fact in
Holt.3 The court of appeals concluded that the sole or dominant pur-
pose of the annexation, as evidenced by the compromise agreement, was
not to deprive black voters of their fifteenth amendment rights." Consti-
tutionally valid reasons for the annexation existed in 1962 when the
judicial proceedings began. The city was suffering from a declining tax
base and required land for industrial and commercial expansion. In
1962, black citizens were a definite minority, and political control was
not an issue. In addition, valid reasons existed for the timing of the
annexation compromise. 5 The existing council feared that if the annexa-
tion were not completed before the imminent city council elections, the
new council majority, supported by an organization of black voters
known to oppose any annexation, would defeat the proposed annexa-
tion. The court characterized this fear as concerning not the possibility
of a black political takeover per se but the possible frustration of years
of effort to achive annexation." If discriminatory motives existed in the
minds of some members of the Richmond City Council, these motives
were not allowed to negate the validity of these dominant, compelling
reasons for the annexation.
The overruling of the district court's findings of fact indicates two
things. First, it gauges how strongly the court of appeals felt about the
case and the issues it presented. Secondly, it reflects upon the nature of
the appeals court's legal analysis of the problem. The main question
presented by the Holt decision is what standards of law should be in-
voked to determine whether an annexation of land, with a consequent
dilution of racial voting power, is in violation of the Constitution.
1d. at 1098.
1Id. at 1099. The court did not explicitly overrule the district court but did so by implication.
.Judge Butner. dissenting, reviewed the evidence which indicated that the principal concern of the
Mayor of Richmond during the annexation negotiations was the exact number of white people who
lived within the area to be annexed. The amount of commercial and industrial land within this area
was hardly discussed. When the annexation agreement was reached, the Mayor received the infor-
mal approval of six members of the City Council but did not even consult the three members known
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The first decision which sheds light on this question is Gomillion
v. Lightfoot.7 In 1960 Gomillion clearly established that the power of
state and municipal authorities to alter municipal boundaries is limited
by the fifteenth amendment. The Alabama State Legislature had re-
drawn the boundaries of Tuskegee from a perfect square to an irregular
twenty-eight-sided figure. The change excluded all but four or five of
Tuskegee's black citizens from the city limits and thus prevented them
from voting in municipal elections. The state and city advanced no
reasons justifying the necessity of such a change in the city boundaries.
The Supreme Court held that "[a] statute which is alleged to have
worked unconstitutional deprivations of petitioners' rights is not im-
mune to attack simply because the mechanism employed by the legisla-
ture is a redefinition of municipal boundaries." 8
Gomillion applied a fifteenth amendment standard to an exclusion
of black voters through the alteration of municipal boundaries. Rey-
nolds v. Sims 9 examined the constitutional effect of the dilution of
voting power. The court declared in Reynolds that Alabama's reap-
portionment plans for its state legislature violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. "[T]he right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the fran-
chise." 0 The condemned apportionment plans diluted voting power of
both blacks and whites by creating and maintaining legislative districts
of grossly unequal size. Large districts were not accorded a proportion-
ally greater number of representatives.
While Reynolds condemned the deliberate dilution of voting power,
it did so under a fourteenth amendment equal protection test. The dilu-
tion of votes produced by a Holt-type annexation is probably best ana-
lyzed under a fifteenth amendment standard, however. The nature of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection test involves a numerical bal-
ancing. One voting district or school system is compared to other dis-
tricts or systems under a quantitative as well as a qualitative standard.
17364 U.S. 339 (1960).
"Id. at 347.
"9377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11Id. at 555.
1'1 d. at 545. The Court relied on Gomiillion to justify the power of federal courts to review
the use of state powers when they are used to cirvumvent a right protected by the Constituton. Id.
at 566. See also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), in which the Court held that plaintiffs
failed to show that congressional district lines in Manhattan had been drawn with either the effect
or the intent to produce racial imbalance.
[Vol. 51
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In Reynolds, legislative districts with large populations elected the same
number of representatives as did districts with much smaller popula-
tions. 22 This relative inequality of voting power between districts made
a fourteenth amendment standard applicable. Such a comparison was
not possible in Gomillion or Holt. In each of these cases, the voting
power of black citizens was affected by an electoral change which al-
tered the nature of the entire voting population and not just the size of
one district in relation to that of another. Thus the more absolute stan-
dard of the fifteenth amendment was applied. The dilution of black
votes in Holt should have been examined to see if it constituted an
"abridgement" of the right to vote as prohibited by the amendment. 3
In Fairley v. Patterson24 and Perkins v. Matthews,25 the Supreme
Court analyzed the dilution of racial voting power resulting from munic-
ipal boundary changes in terms of its fifteenth amendment effects. Both
Fairley and Perkins involved section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 .21 Fairley was a federal suit to determine whether a switch by a
county from single-member-district voting to at-large voting for the
election of county supervisors was a change in voting procedure requir-
ing a section 5 determination of the possible impact on fifteenth amend-
ment rights. Perkins presented a section 5 question concerning the an-
nexation of land by a municipality. The change in boundaries in each
case27 diluted the power of black voters by adding white voters to the
election unit. The Court held in both cases that a change in voting
procedure had occurred and that the resultant dilution of the black
voting strength increased the potential for a fifteenth amendment viola-
tion. Therefore, these changes were held to be subject to prior judicial
review under the act.28 Richmond failed to follow the section 5 proce-
dure before annexing the county land. The Attorney General filed an
objection just before Holt was argued in the Fourth Circuit. However,
2377 U.S. at 545.
"See note I supra.
'1393 U.S. 544 (1969).
5400 U.S. 379 (1971).
-'Voting Rights Act § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was
passed by Congress to aid in the protection of fifteenth amendment rights. Section 1973c provides
that no changes in state or local voting methods and procedures may be put into effect until they
have been submitted to either the District Court for the District of Columbia or to the Attorney
General of the United States for a determination of possible violations of the fifteenth amendment.
*Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), involved the elimination of internal boundaries
and Perkins v. Matthews. 400 U.S. 379 (1971), the expansion of external ones.
"The Court did not rule on the substantive issues of alleged constitutional infringements,
leaving that decision to the proper lower courts. 393 U.S. at 550; 400 U.S. at 382.
1973]
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at the request of the parties, the court proceeded to hear the case without
considering the section 5 question. 29 The court did, however, employ a
fifteenth amendment analysis in making its decision.3"
Although it is relatively clear that the fifteenth amendment should
serve as the legal standard for the analysis of the problem presented by
Holt, it is not clear what factors may be considered in determining
whether a violation of the fifteenth amendment has indeed occurred.
Annexation of land by a municipality is not in itself unconstitutional.
To prove a particular annexation unconstitutional, courts must look
beyond the fact of the annexation. More specifically, the question in
Holt was whether a court should review the motivation behind a legisla-
tive act.
Gomillion was read in one Holt dissent31 as justifying the conclu-
sion that a facially constitutional law may be declared void because of
the unconstitutional motivation of the man who enacted it. Judge Butz-
ner argued that the evidence compelled such an application of
Gomillion: "'Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to
accomplish an unlawful end . . . "32 The deliberate use of a facially
valid annexation scheme to effect the dilution of racial voting blocs is a
violation of the fifteenth amendment, he said, and the determination of
such a violation may rest on an analysis of motivational evidence.33
The Holt majority, however, rejected this application of Gomillion
and relied instead on other Supreme Court decisions which specifically
limited the Gomillion decision. Eight years subsequent to Gomillion the
Court, in United States v. O'Brien,34 declared that it is a well estab-
lished principle of constitutional law that the Court will not invalidate
an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged unconsti-
tutional motive.35 The O'Brien court characterized the Gomillion deci-
sion as standing "not for the proposition that legislative motive is a
proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevi-
table effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional. 3 6
The Court upheld this interpretation in Palmer v. Thompson."




311d. at 1101 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
12Id. at 1100. quoting, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).
1459 F.2d at 1100-01 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
'391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'71d. at 384-85.
31ld. at 384.
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
[Vol. 51
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It is true there is language in some of our cases interpreting the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments which may suggest that the motive
or purpose behind a law is relevant to its constitutionality. . . . But
the focus in those cases was on the actual effect of the enactments, not
upon the motivation which led the States to behave as they did ...
And in Gomillion the Alabama Legislature's gerrymander of the
boundaries of Tuskegee excluded all Negroes from voting in town
elections.
38
Although they expressly relied on O'Brien and Palmer, the Holt
majority only partially adopted the resoning of those Supreme Court
decisions. The Holt court declared that O'Brien and Palmer stated the
general rule for the judicial analysis of legislative motivation, 39 but then
failed to consider the Supreme Court reasoning which distinguishes
Gomillion. Gomillion, as subsequently interpreted by O'Brien" and
Palmer,1 at least compels a determination of the effect of the enact-
ment. However, the Holt court relegated Gomillion to exceptional cases
in which the legislative motive is subject to judicial review but only when
the motive is clear, singular, and dominant.4 2 Unjustly limiting the effec-
tiveness of Gomillion in this manner, the court distinguished Holt from
Gomillion on the facts. In Holt, valid reasons existed for the annexation.
Therefore, the motivations of the responsible city oflicials were, at
worst, only partially illicit. The Holt court would not consider these
illicit motivations as a basis for granting relief when the legislation
under attack was facially constitutional and supported by some valid
motives.4 By deciding the case on the facts, the court of appeals, as
mentioned previously,"4 was forced to reverse the lower court on its
findings as well as its law. The court ignored evidence of the Mayor's
overwhelming concern during the compromise negotiations for the num-
ber of white people in the area to be annexed and his lack of concern
for the amount of available industrial and commercial land." A reversal
on the facts helped the court fit Holt into its all-or-none interpretation
of Gomillion and judicial review of motivation.
The majority also ignored the implications of the Palmer case,
111d. at 225.
11459 F.2d at 1098-99.
"1391 U.S. at 384.
"403 U.S. at 225.
"-459 F.2d at 1097-98.
"'Id. at 1099.
"See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
"See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
19731
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which, as Judge Winter's dissent suggested, may allow motivational
analysis when the effects of the act make a prima facie showing of
unconstitutionality. 6 Judge Winter argued that the annexation, timed
as it was to occur just prior to the election, made a prima facie case of
unconstitutional effect. Once established, the prima facie case could
then, according to Palmer, be supported by evidence of legislative moti-
vation. 7 This view was consistent with the legal position and findings
of fact of the lower court in Holt."s The annexation had a prima facie
unconstitutional effect because it diluted black voting power precisely
at the moment electoral gain might have been reaped from that power.
The timing of the annexation to occur at that moment with the conse-
quent dilution of black votes was the essence of the prima facie case.
The court should have then examined the motives of the Richmond
officials to determine if the timing of the annexation was for the deliber-
ate purpose of abridging black voting power.
The Holt majority, however, was apparently unwilling to assign
any weight to the effects of the timely dilution of votes absent conclusive
proof that the sole or dominant purpose of the annexation was to thwart
a constitutional right.49 A more reasonable approach was indicated by
the Supreme Court in the recent fourteenth amendment school desegre-
gation case, Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia.0 The city desired
to remove its schools from the county school system which had been
recently ordered to desegregate. 1 The Fourth Circuit found the domi-
nant purpose behind the proposed change to be nonracial and refused
to enjoin the separation.52 The Court reversed, holding that the " 'domi-
nant purpose' test finds no precedent in our decisions."53 Palmer was
said to require the Court to focus on "the effect-not the purpose or
motivation-of a school board's action . . . ."" However, once the
effects of a proposed change make a prima facie showing of unconstitu-
tionality, a "heavy burden" is placed on the approving authority to
justify its proposal.55 Demonstrated racial purpose may then be taken
"459 F.2d at 1109 n.3.
'11d. at 1109-10 n.3.
"334 F. Supp. at 237.
"1459 F.2d at 1097-1100.
5192 S. Ct. 2196 (1972).
3'See VA. CODE ANN. § 22-43 (1950). Under Virginia law, a city must provide for the educa-
tion of its children and can choose to create its own school district.
12Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570, 573-74 (4th Cir. 1971).





into consideration in weighing these justifications."
The Supreme Court then would go one step further than Judge
Winter's interpretation of Palmer. Not only would it allow motivational
factors to be considered once a prima facie case has been established,
but it would shift the burden of persuasion to the party responsible for
the challenged activity. In Holt a prima facie case of unconstitutional
effect had been made with the proof of the timing of the dilution of black
votes. The City of Richmond should then have been forced to justify its
actions, and motivational factors should have been considered in deter-
mining whether the city has met its burden of proof.
The Court formulated the Emporia analytical rules in a fourteenth
amendment school desegregation decision. It should logically apply
them to the fifteenth amendment voting rights problem in Holt. Motiva-
tion is perhaps even more relevant to fifteenth amendment problems
where numerical comparisons of equality are not possible as they are
in fourteenth amendment questions. In the meantime, the Holt court
seems to have seized on a hybrid rule of law to avoid rectifying a subtle
infringement on rights guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment. In any
event, the court in its Holt decision has perpetrated the injustice done
by the Richmond annexation and has further confused the issue of when
legislative motivation may be considered by the court in determining the
existence of a violation of the fifteenth amendment.
ALLEN H. OLSON
Constitutional Law-The First Amendment and Advertising: The Effect
of the "Commercial Activity" Doctrine on Media Regulation
Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City of Royal Oak' presented the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan with
a novel first amendment issue framed in the context of media regulation.
Plaintiff Mitchell Family Planning, Inc., a non-profit2 corporation, was
6Id. at 2205. Emporia had had since 1967 to establish its own school system. It began to show
interest in doing so only after the county system was ordered to integrate. The effect of the city's
withdrawal from the county system would have been to increase the number of white students in
city schools and decrease their numbers in the county schools.
'335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
2While the non-profit nature of plaintiff corporation was accepted here, in S.P.S. Consultants,
Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 333 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), plaintiff Martin S. Mitchell was identified
as president of Mitchell Referral Service, Inc., a profit-making enterprise engaged in the referral
of pregnant out-of-state women to New York physicians for the purpose of abortion procurement.
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